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Introduction 
     When we try to analyze the Japanese society in a comparative perspective, 
we tend to take the existence of Japan as a cultural unit for granted. In other 
words people tend to lean on the presupposition that the Japanese archipelago, 
from Hokkaido to Okinawa, has always been a culturally homogeneous unit. In 
reality, however, "Japan" as a cultural unit is nothing but a product of "invented 
tradition." The purpose of this paper is to clarify our understanding of this cultu-
ral unit by analyzing historical processes in modern Japan. 
     By the expression "a product of invented tradition," I suggest that it was 
the product of a historical process of absorbing heterogeneous elements and mod-
ifying them to become a part of the same cultural unit. I can agree that Japanese 
society is, relatively speaking, more homogeneous and has more historically con-
tinuous elements than many other societies. At the same time, because of this 
apparent homogeneity and continuity, people tend to ignore or overlook the 
aspect that Japan as a cultural unit was the product of a certain historical process. 
     In examining this tendency, I would like to pay particular attentlon to the 
process of creating a cultural unit called "Japan." The following analysis will 
therefore focus on the cultural invention aspect which has been ignored in pre-
vious studies.
1 Civil War at the Time of Restoration and Its Legacy 
1. 1 Divided Japan 
     Let me begin with the eve of modern Japan, i.e., the time of Meiji Res-
toration. It was clear that Japan was divided into the two parts: southwestern 
fiefs led by Satsuma and Choshu on the one hand, and northeastern forces which 
supported shogunate government on the other. This hostility may have been the 
residue of the battle between Toyotomi camp and Tokugawa camp at Sekigahara 
in 1600. Or one might say that the hostility between western and eastern forces 
can be traced in the early 13th century, when the Ritsuryo system, with a 
Chinese type of code written in Chinese characters, was in competition with the 
Kamakura-Bakufu, with its Goseibaishikimoku (in 1232), or the law written in 
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kana (Japanese syllabary). 
     Against the above historical background, at least for a few years in the eve 
of modern Japan, serious conflicts took place between western and eastern forces. 
The violent confrontations were temporarily avoided by the peaceful evacuation 
of Edo castle in April 1868, but serious battles continued in Aizu and other places 
until the defeat of Bakufu forces at Hakodate, Hokkaido. (We might note here 
that there is a psychological residue of the conflict even today. A few years ago 
the mayor of Hagi city in former Choshu proposed to Aizu city an official recon-
ciliation, but the proposal was not accepted because of the bitter memory on the 
part of defeated side.)
1. 2 Formation of Counter-culture as a Residue 
     Although violent conflict did not last more than two years, psychological 
tension between western and eastern forces continued in different ways, often in 
terms of bitter written debate. Nakamura Masanao, who had been sent to Eng-
land by the shogunate government, moved to Shizuoka after his return because 
the Shogun was forced to move there in 1868. He translated J.S. Mill's On 
Liberty and published it in Shizuoka in 1872. The translation was widely read by 
activists in "freedom and people's rights movement" (jiyu minken undo). For in-
stance, Kono Hironaka, from a northeastern fief, wrote in his autobiography that 
the translation caused revolutionary change in his ideas. 
     Shiba Shiro, former samurai in Aizu fief, after his return from the seven-
years stay in the US, published a novel called Kajin no Kigu (literally meaning 
Encounters with Beautiful Ladies) in 1885, and it became a major bestseller. 
Visiting Independence Hall in Philadelphia, the hero of the novel, a Japanese 
man, encounters a beautiful woman; she tells him that her father, an activist in 
the Irish independence movement, died in jail. Both of them had admired the in-
dependence movement of the US from Britain. This admiration and the hero's 
sympathy with the Egyptian situation under colonial rule and with the ruined 
people of Poland appeared in the novel seems to be a projection of the author's 
antipathy toward the established Meiji government. 
     Many intellectuals who had belonged to the eastern camp became active in 
forming a counter-culture against the Meiji government led by former samurai in 
Satsuma and Choshu. Newspapers became a strategic base for their activities. 
Fukuchi Gen'ichiro and Kurimoto Joun, both of whom were former retainers of 
the shogunate government, were two of the more famous journalists in this anti-
government camp. 
     Another base of activities among intellectuals from the eastern camp was 
the Christian church. Quite a few active Christians came from either shogunate 
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government or the northern fiefs, among whom Uemura Masahisa is the most 
important figure. Few of them were politically hostile to the Meiji government, 
but many of them wanted to establish a new identity after the defeat of the sho-
gunate government, so that they could maintain some form of independence 
from the new regime. 
1. 3 Absorbing and Marginalizing Counter Forces 
     Those who were dissatisfied with the Meiji government were not neces-
sarily limited to those from the eastern fiefs. After the defeat of the eastern fiefs, 
sporadic rebellions led by dissenting leaders emerged in the western part of Japan; 
Saigo Takamori was the most important of these rebel commanders. After the 
Satsuma Rebellion lead by Saigo in 1877, military revolt became impossible and 
dissatisfied people in politics joined "freedom and people's rights movement" 
which recruited activists from all parts of the nation. In 1881, the decision was 
made to steer the nation after the Prussian model rather than the English type of 
constitutionalism. And in 1889, the Meiji Constitution was promulgated. 
     Thus consolidated, the new establishment tried to absorb capable leaders 
who used to be in the anti-establishment camp. The process of absorbing the 
counter-elite began with ennobling the former fief lords of the eastern camp 
together with those from the western camp. Those counter-elites considered to 
be exceptionally capable were also recruited to serve the newly decided national 
goal of "enriching the nation and strengthening the army" (fukoku kyohei). 
Enomoto Takeaki, who was the commander of the anti-government forces at the 
Hakodate battle, was the most remarkable example. He became Minister of the 
Navy in 1890 and continued to occupy many other important positions. 
     But this was not the fate of all former anti-establishment leaders. In fact, 
the majority of former samurai in the eastern fiefs who had fought against the 
Satsuma-Choshu troops were marginalized, often sent further north to the north-
ern end of the mainland or Hokkaido, which was called Ezo at the time.
2 "Domestication" in the Name of Civilization: "Assimilation 
 (Doka)" of the Ainu 
2. 1 The Development of Hokkaido and Ainu-policy 
     Many mainlanders were forced either socio-politically or economically to 
move to Ezo to develop the resources there. Thus the Ainu, the indigenous peo-
ple there, had to face new difficulties in the same way as those in the American 
frontier. The Meiji government renamed Ezo as Hokkaido and established the 
office of the Commissioner of Colonization. The development of Hokkaido was 
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important not only to enrich the nation but also to defend the nation against the 
attack from the north, i. e. Russia. Thus many mainlanders were settled there as 
farm soldiers. 
     The flood of mainlanders and their cultivation of frontier land deprived 
the Ainu of their right to continue their way of living by fishing and hunting. In 
1899, the government established the "Former Natives' Protection Law" which 
allocated a certain amount of land to the indigenous people for cultivation, and 
encouraged school education. The Darwinian reason given for this particular leg-
islation was that without help, the Ainu, who were less "developed," would 
cease to exist as a consequence of the "scientific rule" of survival of the fittest. 
     Some historians give various guesses concerning why at this particular 
time such a law was enacted. One guess is that because of the acquisition of a 
new colony in Taiwan in 1895 the regime wanted to establish rules regarding its 
governance of indigenous peoples. A second guess, based on fairly convincing 
evidence, was that the government feared that the dissatisfied Ainu would be 
organized by foreign missionaries, because many Christian missionaries were en-
gaged in educating the Ainu.
2.2 The Influence of the Dawes Act in the US 
     Yet another guess is that Meiji leaders were influenced by the Dawes 
Severalty Act in 1887, which dealt with indigenous peoples in the US. Because 
many Americans participated in the development of Hokkaido, this influence 
may have been natural. In fact, there are two important similarities between the 
two laws: one is the allocatlon of land to indigenous people and another is prom-
otion of education. There are, on the other hand, important differences. The 
Dawes Act, for example, allocated 80 acres of land to each person without the 
need for any application, whereas in Japan, people had to make special applica-
tions in order to receive less than one-sixth that amount. 
      Related to education, both laws encouraged people to learn the national 
language (English or Japanese), and de-emphasized the indigenous mother ton-
gue. Language education was in both cases justified in the name of civilization: in 
order to be civilized, indigenous people had to be good at the language of the 
advanced civilization. 
      Furthermore, in the Japanese case, education included special emphasis on 
the loyalty of the Ainu to the emperor. When special schools for the Ainu were 
established, students began their classes with a solemn ritual of bowing in the 
direction of the imperial palace and reciting an oath as the emperor's loyal sub-
ject.
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2. 3 Creating "A Brave Former-Native Soldier" 
     The education of the Ainu with emphasis on language and loyalty was 
useful for creating brave soldiers. Actually, some Ainu proved to be especially 
capable in rescue work in 1902, when Japanese troops met with disaster in milit-
ary practice in heavy snow. Some then proposed to form a special fighting unit 
composed of Ainu. Instead of approving this proposal, the government decided 
to recruit them into the general conscription system which had been put into 
force in Hokkaido in 1898. 
     Those Ainu who were drafted into regular units participated in the Russo-
Japanese war in 1904-1905. Fifty-one out of sixty-three such soldiers were deco-
rated in recognition of their brilliant service. In particular, one soldier who was 
given the Japanese name Kitakaze Isokichi was headlined in the newspapers as "a 
courageous former-native soldier. " The treatment of Ainu soldiers as war heroes 
gave incentive to the indigenous people to assimilate into the Japanese way of 
life. 
     Special schools for the Ainu were abolished in 1922, so that they would be 
entirely integrated into the general educational system. In the integrated schools, 
social discrimination became more visible to the Ainu children, but they could 
not find any way of overcoming or escaping from the discrimination. Partly en-
couraged by the movement against discrimination among the Buraku people, 
some Ainu became interested in creating a movement to promote their social sta-
tus. Even in this case too, however, they wanted to be equal as the emperor's 
subjects. For instance, one such activists clearly stated that the Ainu could be 
proud of the fact that there had been no disloyal persons among them.
3 Overcoming of the Duality in Loyalty: Annexation of Okinawa 
3. 1 The Extinction of Ryukyu Kingdom 
     While the assimilation policy was being forcefully carried out in Hok-
kaido, called "the Northern Gate of the Empire," a similar process was going on 
in Okinawa, the southern end of the country. One important difference between 
northern and southern ends was that in the latter the indigenous people (Okina-
wans) had a 500-year tradition of ruling their own kingdom. The kingdom of 
Ryukyu had had a close relationship with both mainland Japan and China. For 
instance, since the 17th century the king of Ryukyu ascended the throne with the 
approval of the Shimazu fief lord, but at the same time, the kingdom had been in 
a tributary system of the Chinese "Central Empire." 
     In 1879 the Japanese government sent the troops to Okinawa to end this 
dual loyalty. The king was forced to move to Tokyo and later became a noble 
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and a member of House of Peers. If we can compare the Ainu with the indige-
nous people in the US, the analogy probably holds similarly for the Japanese 
annexation of Okinawa and the American annexation of Hawaii. The king of 
Hawaii, however, did not become a noble and instead the name of the king is 
simply remembered as the name of a street. 
3.2 The "Assimilation" Policy 
     The "assimilation" policy in Okinawa had the same emphasis on education 
as in the case of the Ainu, but in this case, probably because of the larger number 
of more educated population, a normal school was established in 1880 to train fu-
ture teachers, recruited among the Okinawans. Teaching the Japanese language 
and cultivating a sense of loyalty were two major foci in school education. The 
picture of the emperor was "granted" to Okinawan schools prior to those in 
other prefectures. 
     During the period of Sino Japanese war in 1894 and 1895 there were some 
Okinawan political forces in favor of Chinese victory, but after China's defeat, 
they lost their influence and Japan firmly eliminated dual political loyalty. Thus, 
the conscription system was introduced in 1898, although the right to vote was 
not given until 1912, i. e. twenty-two years later than for the people in the main-
land. 
     The forced "assimilation" policy, accompanied by such forms of discri-
mination as the restriction of indigenous language and customs, created various 
kinds of dissatisfaction. Although political protest, sometimes with the expecta-
tion of help from China, turned out to be unsuccessful, a strike among middle 
school students, who were protesting a discriminatory schoolmaster, ended with 
his forced resignation. Incidentally, the schoolmaster thereafter got a new job in 
Taiwan, ending up in charge of education there. 
3.3 Stepping-stone for Further Expansion 
     This fact, together with the fact that the first schoolmaster of the normal 
school in Okinawa and an Okinawan graduate got jobs in charge of Taiwanese 
education, indicates a close relationship between Okinawa and Taiwan. And the 
similarity in "assimilation-oriented education" in the two areas was a natural re-
sult of this relationship. 
      The unfavorable employment environment in Okinawa, however, forced 
many Okinawans to leave to find work elsewhere. The labor market for unskil-
led workers in the western part of the mainland invited many Okinawans who 
had been educated in the Japanese language. Although they were severely dis-
criminated against, "assimilation-oriented" education was a necessary condition 
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for finding a job in the mainland. 
      Quite a few Okinawans emigrated. Starting from 1899, when twenty-six 
Okinawans left for Hawaii, the number of emigrants from Okinawa grew rapid-
ly, reaching 4,670 in 1906. They spread not only in Hawaii and other part of the 
US, but also to many Latin American countries, the Philippines, Singapore and 
other parts of Southeast Asia, and to the Pacific islands. Unlike the Ainu, the 
possibility of going abroad made Okinawans more open to the wider world 
across the border, and made the ruling elite in Japan suspicious about the sense of 
loyalty among Okinawans. 
     On the other hand, as the level of education improved, including students 
sent to the mainland, some highly educated Okinawans could benefit from social 
promotion. In one case, an Okinawan navy officer was promoted to the rank of 
rear admiral. Such an example provided an incentive to get a better education, 
but discrimination prevented this from being an easy recipe for success. Instead 
quite a few got jobs in Taiwan and other Southeast Asian areas occupied by 
Japan as it began to extend its sphere of influence. Thus Okinawa provided Japan 
with personal resources for the expansion of the Japanese empire.
4 "Assimilation" in the First Formal Colony, Taiwan 
4. 1 "Gradual Application of Mainland Rule" 
     In terms of its usefulness in Japan's imperial expansion, Okinawa played 
an even more important role by providing a good example of "assimilation" poli-
cy, which could then be used in the newly obtained colony of Taiwan. When 
Taiwan became the first formal colony of Japan, there were serious disputes 
among ruling elite concerning how to rule the new colony. The focal point was 
whether they should use the same legal system as that in mainland or the colony 
should be ruled in a different way from the mainland. 
     As the result of compromise the government decided to adopt "the princi-
ple of gradual application of mainland rule, " which means in proportion to the 
extent of assimilation the type of rule in the mainland would be applied in the 
colony. In order to advocate the adoption of this principle, supporters often cited 
the Okinawan case. They said that it took some time for Okinawa to be 
absorbed into Japan, but since Okinawa had successfully become a part of Japan, 
Taiwan would follow the same course. 
     Of course Taiwan had been a part of China and people there had had their 
own tradition. To those who advocated "the principle of gradual application of 
mainland rule," however, the people in Taiwan seemed to have cultural and 
ethnic affinity to Japan, because both had a Confucian tradition expressed by 
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Chinese characters and both belong to the "yellow" race. 
4. 2 Justification for "Assimilation" (Doka) 
      In the process of absorbing Taiwan into Japan as a cultural unit, we need 
to distinguish between two types of residents. One type was the indigenous peo-
ple of the island, whose treatment by the government was similar to the policy 
vis-a-vis Ainus: i.e., domestication in the name of civilization. Because of the 
military consideration of maintaining order, a forcible "assimilation" policy was 
carried out and violent protests took place. Among them the most remarkable 
one was Musha incident in 1930, when more than two thousand soldiers and 
policemen killed about one thousand indigenous people. 
     Another type of people in Taiwan were those who had come from the 
Chinese continent, and they were not to be handled easily either. Although they 
were given their opportunity to choose their nationality within two years of 
Japan's possession of Taiwan, even among those who became Japanese nationals 
there was still a strong sense of pride concerning their traditions. The Japanese 
ruling elite tried to find a justification for their "assimilation" policy in the fol-
lowing way: the victory of Japan in the Sino Japanese war proved that Japan had 
been more successful in advancing civilization than China, and therefore there 
was sufficient reason for Japan to guide another Asian nation with a Confucian 
tradition toward civilization. 
      As for the content of "assimilation" education, language and loyalty were 
emphasized, as they were in the case of Okinawa. Because of the long tradition 
of Chinese culture, it was only in 1940 when the government succeeded in abo-
lishing the column in Chinese in newspapers. 
     The cultivation of loyalty was not easy either. The method used was, 
however, the same as in the case of Okinawa: the promotion of a few to stimu-
late patriotism on the one hand, and marginalization of many on the other. The 
examples of the former case were the appointment of a collaborator to a member 
of House of Peers, and the promotion of Taiwanese intellectuals to become high 
officials in the puppet governments in Manchoukuo and in Nanking. 
      In contrast to these promotion cases, many Taiwanese were used in the 
battlefield in the Chinese continent for military transport and as translators. La-
ter, when Japan expanded further to invade Southeast Asia, many Taiwanese 
were forced to serve in military operations in one way or another. 
4.3 The Way toward the "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" 
     Although the Taiwanese were discriminated against by the mainlanders, 
they engaged in Japan's military aggression with the awareness that they 
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belonged to the Japanese empire. In the latter sense the unit of Japanese culture 
had been expanded to absorb the Taiwanese not only in the eyes of ruling elite 
but also in the mind of the Taiwanese themselves, at least when they faced the 
outside world. 
     In 1942 the volunteer system for military service was introduced in 
Taiwan, and, particularly among volunteers from indigenous people, special 
fighting units were formed to join battles in the Philippines, Indonesia, and other 
areas in Southeast Asia. It was surprising that one soldier belonging to this unit 
was found in Indonesia in 1974, almost thirty years after the defeat of Japan. He 
was such an obedient soldier as to hide and survive without surrendering to the 
enemy. In 1943, the conscription system started in Taiwan and all strong 
Taiwanese youths were recruited for military service although the right to vote 
was not given to the Taiwanese until 1945, and they did not have opportunity to 
exercise that right before the defeat.
5 The Bridge to the Continent: The Korean Case 
5. 1 Geographic Position and Strategic Considerations 
     For Japan, the Korean peninsula has long been the connecting bridge with 
the Chinese continent. Because of this geographical position Korea has played an 
important role in introducing Chinese civilization into Japan since the fifth cen-
tury. In the modern period, however, military and strategic Importance was 
added to this consideration, because Korea was the focal point of the international 
power struggles between China and Japan, and between Russia and Japan. 
     Japan's colonial rule of Korea since the annexation in 1910 had many simi-
larities, such as "assimilation" education, to that in Taiwan. There were, howev-
er, some important differences as well. One was the existence of an independent 
kingdom in Korea; the king was forced to agree to the annexation and to move 
to Tokyo to become a noble. A second difference was that because of the form 
of "voluntary" annexation, the Korean people did not have the choice of national-
ity which the Taiwanese had. The only possible way for Koreans to refuse 
Japanese nationality was to escape across the northern border to China. Some of 
them became activists in guerrilla operations around the border to fight against 
Japanese rule. 
     A third major difference between Korea and Taiwan is related to the im-
portance of military strategy. Taiwan had civilian governor-generals for 17 years 
as the result of the influence of "Taisho democracy" movement, but in Korea all 
governor-generals were military persons. And half of them later became prime 
ministers in Japan. Even when some modification in colonial rule became neces-
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sary because of the fierce independence movement in 1919, an admiral - not a 
civilian - replaced a general as governor-general.
5. 2 The Process of "Japanization" in Korea 
     Despite these differences, the method of "Japanization" through "assimila-
tion" education was the same in Korea as in Taiwan. In both cases the emphases 
of such education were on language and loyalty. The migration of many Koreans 
into the mainland encouraged the learning of Japanese, because in order to find a 
better job language ability was needed. The effectiveness of language education, 
however, is somewhat dubious; according to a report in 1936, when the Korean 
parents at a meeting of a nursery school for Korean children in Kyoto were 
ordered by the police to talk only in Japanese, many had to keep silence. 
     The difficulty in cultivating loyalty in the Korean mind was not very 
different from the Taiwanese case. One difference was that there were some who 
advocated a theory that the Japanese and Korean peoples had come from the 
same ancestor. This theory, however, could not persuade many people both 
among Japanese and Koreans. Although in 1912 the government ordered the 
ceremony of reading the Imperial Rescript on Education on ceremonial occasions, 
the content of the Rescript could not be applied without modification, because it 
was said that it contained the imperial ancestors' teachings on the conduct of life. 
      In fact, more important was the ritual rather than the content of what was 
written in the Rescript, because the ceremony of reading it was simply a formal-
ity by means of which the Koreans proved that they were obedient imperial sub-
jects. Probably a more important incentive for cultivating a sense of loyalty 
among Koreans was their expectation to be socially promoted. Although the 
actual opportunity was very much limited, there was a possibility of climbing up 
the social ladder by graduating from good universities. At the time of the cere-
mony of accession to the throne in 1928, one Korean student at the University of 
Kyoto, who was a grandson of an important collaborator, was allowed to join 
the ceremony. This was widely reported by the newspapers, although at the 
same time many Koreans who were suspected to be leftists or active in independ-
ence movements were either arrested or sent back to Korea. 
      The strategy of promoting some who collaborated and marginalizing the 
many who resisted was the main tool for realizing the government's policy of 
"uniting the mainland and Korea." As this policy gradually took roots, in 1938 
the volunteer system was introduced and it was followed by the conscription sys-
tem five years later. Moreover, many Koreans were recruited as civilians in the 
military service, among whom the most important case was that of guards of 
prisoners of war. Out of about three thousand such Korean guards, 148 were
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prosecuted as war criminals for their treatment of POWs. 
5.3 Use of Orientalist Policy and Its Modification 
     When E.B. Cromer's Modern Egypt, which is described by E. Said as one 
of the typical products of "orientalism," was translated into Japanese in 1911, 
Okuma Shigenobu wrote in the introduction that he had presented the original 
book to Ito Hirobumi to be used for Ito's control over Korea, then a protectorate 
of Japan. There was no evidence how much it was used. Judging from what 
happened, however, it was clear that control in the name of civilization was the 
common element found both in European and Japanese colonial rules. 
     While European colonial rule based on "orientalism" emphasized cultural 
differences between occidental and oriental cultures, Japan's colonial rule inten-
tionally stressed the affinity between cultures in the mainland and colonies. This 
difference can easily be exemplified in the field of education in colonies. The 
western orientalists, including Cromer did not introduce their own language on 
the elementary school level, whereas in Japanese policy the education of the chil-
dren in colonies was in Japanese from the elementary school level. 
      Thus an interesting two-sidedness of Japan's colonial rule should be 
pointed out here. On the one hand, the colonial rule was justified in the name of 
civilization, i. e. because of the Japan's superior position of being more "civil-
ized," or, in another word, "westernized." On the other hand, Japan wanted to 
absorb her colonies into her own cultural unit by evoking the sense of cultural 
affinity existed in colonies. The cultural affinity was particularly emphasized 
when oriental or Asiatic spiritualism and groupism was contrasted to the mater-
ialism and individualism (in Japanese expression the term has a pejorative con-
notation like egoism) in the West. If this superiority complex as the another side 
of the inferiority complex to the West can be called "occidentalism," Japan's col-
onial policy was a paradoxical combination between "orientalism" and 
"occidentalism": the aspect of "orientalism" was used to justify the hegemony of 
Japan as the most advanced country among Asian nations, and the aspect of 
"occidentalism" played an important role to appeal to the sense of solidarity 
among Asian peoples who had been suffering from the western imperialism.
6 Expansion of the Cultural Unit "Japan" and the Change in 
  Content 
6. 1 Elasticity and Situationality of the Unit 
     After having a quick glance on the historical process of Japan's colonial 
policy, let me indicate some characteristics related to my major Subject, i.e. Japan 
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as a cultural unit. Japan's colonial policy had many difficulties and conflicts, but 
as far as one particular nature of absorbing colonies into her own cultural unit is 
concerned, the goal was relatively well achieved. At least some soldiers recruited 
from colonies fought seriously as emperor's subjects and thus proved that a 
Japanese value system had been internalized to some extent. 
     The flexibility of the border of Japanese culture in absorbing people in col-
onies through "assimilation" policy was accompanied by another aspect, i. e. its 
nature of situationality. Japan as a cultural unit was situational in two senses: 
firstly it did not mean that all people in the unit were treated equally; and 
secondly one could be "in" on one occasion and "out" on another occasion. The 
second aspect requires some additional explanation. There were many concentric 
circles with the emperor in the center. People in colonies may have been treated 
as being outside the inner circle of Japanese culture if the mainland and colonies 
were contrasted. Yet the same people were treated as Japanese, i. e. within a larger 
circle of Japanese culture, vis-a-vis outsiders who have no Japanese nationality. 
      For instance, there were approximately two million Koreans in the puppet 
country Manchoukuo at the end of the last war. They were sometimes treated as 
outsiders because some of them had escaped from the Korean peninsula with a 
hostile feeling toward Japanese rule. On other occasions, however, they were 
considered the Japanese emperor's subjects because some of them were forced to 
settle down to expand Japan's sphere of influence. 
      This situational nature is closely related to the two-sided ideological char-
acteristic of the emperor system. On the one hand, the idea of "under imperial 
rule all subjects are equal" seemed to be egalitarian, but it is nothing but a rela-
tive equality vis-a-vis outsiders. On the other hand, there was a principle of 
hierarchical order that distinguished higher rank from lower rank. And this rank-
ing was decided by the distance from the emperor. 
      And the link that connected these seemingly contradictory ideas was the 
slight possibility for the people in the lower rank, such as those in the colonies, 
to be promoted socially in proportion to the degree of their assimilation, and 
thus to become closer to the emperor. In this sense, there remained the possibil-
ity, however small, that those in the lower rank may be promoted to a higher 
rank and those in the outer circle may be allowed to join the inner circle. 
6. 2 The Change of Ideological Content with the Expansion of the Empire 
      In order to absorb people in colonies with different tradition into the ex-
panded empire, there was a need to modify the ideological content of the empire. 
Loyalty to the emperor continued to be the focal point, but it could not be justi-
fied by the family-state idea, i. e. the belief in the myth of emperor's being the 
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head of an extended family of subjects sharing a common ancestor. In this sense, 
patriotism in the 1930s needed a difference in emphasis from that at the end of 
the 19th century. 
     In order to adjust to the new situation to absorb people in colonies emph-
asis moved from patriarchal principle to something more flexible. Watsuji Tet-
suro's 1934 article "The Japanese Spirit," which emphasized the "tolerance" of the 
Japanese character, and Hasegawa Nyozekan's best-selling 1938 book, Japanese 
Characteristics, with its emphasis on Japan's "assimilationist" tendency, were 
typical works that corresponded to this new need. 
     The above discourses seemed to be more liberal than "kokutai" ideologies 
in the Meiji period or those which were advocated by extreme rightists among 
their contemporaries. In reality, they were not really liberal, because although 
they used the term "tolerance," they lacked the sensitivity to the difference of 
cultures. They advocated the "flexibility" of Japanese culture in order to absorb 
people in colonies without genuine awareness of the difference of culture. 
     The above modification created new difficulties. If its characteristic is the 
tendency to be flexible in absorbing new elements, the question must be raised 
concerning what is the positive content of such a value system. The modification 
to make the system more flexible thus sacrificed the substantive content of the 
value. As a result, loyalty to the emperor was demonstrated through adherence 
to rituals; the performance of the ritual became more important than the content 
of the value which is represented by the ritual. Such rituals as the ceremony of 
reciting the oath as the emperor's loyal subject and bowing in the direction of the 
imperial palace became a part of routine daily life. 
6.3 Spread of Conformism from Colony to the Mainland 
     The ritualization first took place in colonies when the "assimilation" policy 
was forcefully carried out. Then the same tendency was introduced into the 
mainland partly because the content of imperial ideology became vague and part-
ly because half of the governor-generals of Korea became prime ministers in 
Japan and introduced the same method of manipulation. 
      In fact, many elite bureaucrats in colonial rule received important jobs in 
Japan and fully utilized their experiences in colonial rule. Another example here 
was the use of "voluntary groups," which had by nature to be, extragovernmen-
tal, for supporting this "ritualization" of public life and the demonstration of 
loyalty. The ritualization for cultivating loyalty and mass mobilization through 
various organizations, which were at the end integrated into one monolithic body 
called the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, resulted in hyper-patriotic con-
formism. 
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     Ironically enough, though the attempted military coup in 1936 turned out 
to be unsuccessful, the ascendance of leaders with experience in colonial rule 
helped to establish a "garrison-prison state" for the whole of Japan to carry out 
the total war.
7 Legacy in the Post-war Period 
7. 1 The Indifference toward Decolonization 
     As a result of Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the territory 
of Japan shrank to Japanese archipelago. The former colonies became independ-
ent of the Japanese empire. Japan's surrender to the allied forces meant that it did 
not need to be troubled by the process of decolonization, as was the case of many 
western imperialist powers. Because an awareness of the need for decolonization 
was lacking among Japanese elites, they did not pay sufficient attention to the 
people who had belonged to colonies. While Germany gave the opportunity to 
choose nationality to the Austrian people who had been under German rule for 
seven years, the Japanese government arbitrarily deprived the people of former 
colonies of their Japanese nationality, no matter where they lived. Thus 
about forty thousand Koreans were left in Sakhalin for more than fifty years. 
There have been may other problems due to this policy of unilaterally depriving 
nationality. One example of these problems relates to the lack of compensation 
for the damage during the war to the people in former colonies. 
     In addition to this, the flexibility of the cultural unit, which played an im-
portant role when the empire expanded, made Japanese people experience the 
shrinking process as if it were something natural, because expansion had been 
gradual and considered to be natural. The feeling about the shrinking process 
may be related to the indifference of many mainlanders toward the separation of 
Okinawa, which became a district under the direct military rule of the US. Since 
the border had gradually expanded to absorb new elements, not many were in-
terested in how much territory was lost as a result of the shrinking process. In 
the eyes of the people in the center, the periphery was not very important any-
way. The secret emperor's message in September 1947 to the Occupation author-
ity to ask the continuation of military occupation of Okinawa exemplified this 
attitude. 
      As a result of the shrinking process, a smaller territory without colonies 
seemed to be more homogeneous than before. Thus the Japanese people tended 
to believe that the myth of homogeneous society was more applicable than be-
fore. In reality, however, the Okinawans had to wait for 26 years until they got 
the same right to vote as the mainlanders obtained in 1946. Even thereafter the 
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discrimination against Okinawa has continued, indicated by the fact that 75% of 
the American military bases in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa.
7.2 Center-periphery Relationship 
     In this way the relationship between center and periphery or that between 
north and south has continued within the smaller territory. Although the nation-
al goal of strengthening the army has ceased to exist, "enriching the nation" has 
continued to be important as a national goal. Thus, because of "developmental-
ism, " with its emphasis on increased GNP, the gap between the advanced or de-
veloped areas and underdeveloped areas has continued. The less developed 
periphery has always been scarified for rapid development by, for example, the 
construction of dams and nuclear power stations for providing electricity for in-
dustrial development in the center. 
     The north-south relationship is noticeable not only geographically but also 
socially. The new school system, which was institutionalized after the American 
model, played an important role in "assimilation-oriented" education to produce 
appropriate human resources for rapid economic growth. Those who cannot 
catch up with others in adjusting to the goal of the education system are margi-
nalized and discriminated against.
7.3 Historical Continuity 
      If we look at the post-war situation in the above way, we have to con-
clude that there is a historical continuity in recreating cultural unity centered 
around the dominant value-orientation. The content of the values may by diffe-
rent from before, but the manner of producing cultural unity is the same. The 
current process of creating cultural unity has two notable features. On the one 
hand, the assimilation into the dominant culture is justified in the name of civi-
lization or for the sake of development. Since ethnocentric fanaticism with loyal-
ty to the emperor as a divine figure has been discredited, the seemingly universal 
and more "rational" goal of development has become the most important ideolo-
gical basis for the new value-orientation. 
      Another aspect was added after the emergence of the increased national 
confidence in the 1970s and 80s. It is a more particularistic element with an 
emphasis on cultural identity. One indication of this emphasis was the discourse 
called Nihonbunkaron, which advocated the uniqueness and superiority of 
Japanese culture. 
      The above two aspects seem to be contrasting and contradictory with each 
other. In reality, however, they complement each other in the same way as does 
the relationship between orientalism and occidentalism mentioned above. The 
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orientalist element, i. e. orientation toward "rational" goal of development facili-
tates the assimilation to the dominant culture in the center, and the occidentalist 
element is useful to maintain internal conformity vis-a-vis outside world. 
     After the emergence of the NIES as economic powers in the 1980s, a new 
tendency emerged related to the second element. It was the tendency to evaluate 
Japan as a model for the "Asian" type of development. What is meant by the 
"Asian t
ype" is usually not clear. Sometimes it is identified with Confucian tradi-
tion and occasionally used as an excuse to be excluded from the application of 
universal value such as human rights. The "Look East" policy adopted by the 
Malaysian government seemed to support this idea. Recent economic difficulties 
in many Asian countries including Japan have made many people feel that the 
success of "Asian" type of development is dubious even if there were such a 
type.
8 Conclusion 
      After the Japan's defeat, started another cycle of development which was 
not very different from the past. The continuity in the context of this paper ex-
ists in the two-sided effect of assimilation to the dominant culture in the center: 
intensifying internal conformity while expanding the cultural unity in a concen-
tric way. In the postwar period, however, the expansion of political territory has 
been strictly forbidden. Instead the expansion of sphere of economic influence 
was realized by stationing Japanese "colonies" composed of dispatched business-
men in capital cities in Asian countries. 
     The two ways of justifying the forced assimilation have also been con-
tinuous: On the one hand in the name of civilization or for the sake of develop-
ment, and on the other by emphasizing the uniqueness and superiority of the 
Japanese culture. 
      The second cycle which started after the defeat is now coming to an end 
because of the internal difficulties and the pressure from abroad. The internal dif-
ficulty comes from the diversification within the so-called homogeneous society. 
The voices of minority groups such as Koreans and Ainus together with other 
groups facing discrimination, such as handicapped people, have become more in-
fluential than before. 
      The people in the periphery have begun to express their own views even 
against the "national interest" defined by the people in the center. For instance, 
the referendum in Maki town decided against the construction of nuclear power 
station and as a result questioned the energy policy decided on by the national 
center. Additionally, the referendum in Okinawa demanded the reduction of 
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American military bases and by doing so questioned the national security policy 
of the central government. 
     From abroad the north-south relations are being questioned related to the 
problem of ODA. Many of the "economic aid" programs have been profitable 
for Japanese business and ruling elites in the recipient countries, with, for inst-
ance, the sacrifice of local people who are forced to leave the land they live for 
the construction of dams. The transnational cooperation of many NGOs tackling 
the problem of ODA is now exerting influence on government policy-making. 
     Now the time has come to reexamine the pattern of development and the 
process of creating a cultural unit to buttress such development. How it can be 
done successfully is another task to be tackled separately. In this paper, I have 
aimed simply to clarify the historical process of producing cultural unity, with 
the hope that this analysis will be necessary step for overcoming difficulties 
caused by forced assimilation.
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